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Abstract 
 
Accident reports provide important insights into the causes and 
contributory factors leading to particular adverse events.   In 
contrast, this paper provides an analysis that extends across the 
findings presented over ten years investigations into maritime 
accidents by both the US National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) and Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB).   The 
purpose of the study was to assess the comparative frequency of a 
range of causal factors in the reporting of adverse events.   In order 
to communicate our findings, we introduce J-H graphs as a means of 
representing the proportion of causes and contributory factors 
associated with human error, equipment failure and other high level 
classifications in longitudinal studies of accident reports.  Our 
results suggest the proportion of causal and contributory factors 
attributable to direct human error may be very much smaller than 
has been suggested elsewhere in the human factors literature.   In 
contrast, more attention should be paid to wider systemic issues, 
including the managerial and regulatory context of maritime 
operations.   
 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper stems from a continuing study to validate assertions about the 
distribution of causes in adverse events.  We are particularly concerned to establish 
whether or not the majority of accidents are ‘blamed’ on direct operator error.   The 
results of an initial investigation into the causes of all major accidents and incidents 
in North American aviation from 1996 to 2003 cast doubt on previous studies that 
had asserted the importance of individual human factors in the immediate causes of 
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adverse events (Johnson and Holloway, 2004).   This work led to wider studies into 
accident reports across a range of other industries including rail and highway 
transportation (Holloway and Johnson, 2005, 2006).   In contrast, this paper reports 
on our work to replicate the previous study and identify the proportion of causes and 
contributory factors associated with human error in the North American maritime 
industries across the decade from 1996 to 2006. 
As mentioned, our initial work focused on the distribution of causal factors 
identified in aviation accident and incident reports.   This decision was justified by 
the prominence of claims about human error in this industry.   The first study 
focussed on all major adverse event reports issues by the US National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board 
(TSB) between 1996 and 2003 (Holloway and Johnson, 2004).   This yielded a total 
of 26 US and 27 Canadian aviation investigations.   Later sections will discuss the 
methods used in more detail.  For now it is sufficient to observe that two analysts 
went through each of these reports developing their own independent classification 
scheme to distinguish between broad categories of causal and contributory factors.   
This identified approximately 40 causes and 53 contributory factors in the NTSB 
dataset and 50 causes with 53 contributory factors for the TSB.  The subsequent 
classifications showed that only 37% of causal factors in the NTSB study related to 
individual human error.  In contrast, 48% of causes and contributory factors can be 
categorized as organizational.   12% related to equipment.  ‘Other’ causes accounted 
for 3%.  In contrast, for the TSB 50% of the causes and contributory factors were 
related to individual error, 22% to organizational issues, 20% to equipment and 8% 
to ‘other’ factors.   Although human error remains a significant factor in many of 
these accident reports, it is not true that investigatory agencies ignore the 
organizational issues that create the context for adverse events.   It is also apparent 
from our study that the differences between the NTSB and the TSB reflect 
important differences in the types of air operations, and hence accidents, that occur 
in US and Canadian air space (Johnson and Holloway, 2004).  The Canadian 
datasets contain far more incidents involving private pilots and technologically 
unsophisticated small aircraft.   There are thus correspondingly fewer opportunities 
for organizational issues to intervene in these incidents, where single individuals 
will be performing most of the operations.  We have recently extended these initial 
aviation studies by analysing the causes and contributory factors cited in NTSB 
reports for three different sample periods 1976-1984, 1996-2004 and 2004-2006.   
The preliminary results show considerable differences over this time period.  The 
proportion of direct operator ‘errors’ diminishes as the proportion of organisational 
causes rises between the first and second samples.  There is evidence that the 
proportion of causes due to human error has risen again in the most recent group of 
accident reports (Johnson and Holloway, in press).   
The results of this initial study may not be typical of other safety-critical 
industries.  The relatively high levels of training and regulatory control make it 
likely that organisational issues would be more prominent than human error in 
aviation when compared to other domains.  Such caveats motivate the study, 
reported in this paper, of North American maritime accidents.   Further motivation 
is provided by a recent survey commissioned by the UK Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (2004).   This examined 66 accidents.  The report argued that 
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one third of all the groundings involved a fatigued officer who was alone on the 
bridge at night.  Two thirds of all the vessels involved in collisions were not 
maintaining ‘a proper lookout’.   An important strength of the MAIB study was that 
it published the methodology that was used to support these findings; ‘Once 
selected, the accidents were then reviewed in detail by MAIB nautical inspectors in 
order to complete a questionnaire (Annex A) covering many aspects of bridge watch 
keeping practice, which had been developed for this study. The data gathered was 
input to a human factors database before analysis.’   This scientific approach 
enables subsequent analysts to replicate their methods and, therefore, validate their 
results.   Many previous studies have failed to provide readers with this 
methodological information.   However, a number of caveats can be raised about the 
manner in which the accidents were selected for the MAIB study.   The study 
excluded fishing and commercial vessels under 500 gross tons.  Accidents involving 
vessels berthing, at anchor, or under pilotage, were also excluded.  This reflected 
the study’s focus on bridge watch-keeping during a passage rather than on 
navigation or maneuvering.  The study also focused on the insights obtained by 
individual investigators looking at each accident.  There does not seem to have been 
any attempt to conduct inter-analyst comparisons for individual reports. 
 
2 Method 
We were concerned to develop results that could be challenged or replicated by 
other researchers.   All of the materials used in this study are available on-line and 
can be accessed by contacting the first author.  We were also concerned to assess 
the validity of our results by comparing the insights obtained from different 
analysts.   We, therefore, used two investigators to extract the causes and 
contributory factors from the accident reports that we studied.   Each had more than 
a decade’s experience in the development and analysis of safety-critical systems.   
Each studied the same sample of maritime accident reports.  By choosing a ten-year 
window, the sample yielded a total of 22 accident reports from the NTSB and 160 
from the TSB.  This imbalance partly reflects the relative prominence of the 
Canadian maritime industries.   It also reflects the way in which the TSB groups 
major and minor incidents within a single reporting framework.   In contrast, the 
NTSB explicitly separates major accident reports from accident briefs, which were 
excluded from our study.   Rather than impose our own arbitrary distinctions about 
the seriousness of each adverse event, we chose to analyse all of the TSB reports 
containing chapter headings presented within the period of our study.  The reports 
ranged from high profile, multiple fatality accidents such as the Fire on Board the 
Panamanian passenger ship Universe Explorer through to less severe grounding 
incidents.    
Our analysis progressed by extracting the causal and contributory factors that 
were identified in the aftermath of each investigation.  This preprocessing stage was 
necessary to insure that each of the analysts focused on the same source, given that 
most of the documents were many pages in length.   The identification of all 
relevant sections in each report was performed as a collaborative activity between 
the analysts.   There were, however, important differences in the treatment of the 
documents.  These stemmed from the way in which the Canadian and US agencies 
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structure their findings.   The NTSB provides a summary that distinguishes between 
probable causes and contributory factors in the following way: 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause 
of the collision between the Coast Guard patrol boat CG242513 and the small 
passenger vessel Bayside Blaster was the failure of the coxswain of the Coast 
Guard patrol boat to operate his vessel at a safe speed in a restricted-speed area 
frequented by small passenger vessels and in conditions of limited visibility due 
to darkness and background lighting. Contributing to the cause of the accident 
was the lack of adequate Coast Guard oversight of non-standard boat 
operations. (NTSB MAR-02/05) 
 
Canadian TSB reports contain a section entitled ‘Findings as to Causes and 
Contributing Factors’.   The analysis was less straightforward, however, because 
these documents did not explicitly separate causes and contributing factors.   Each 
analyst, therefore, had to separate probable causes from contributory factors in TSB 
reports even though the distinctions were clearly presented in the NTSB reports.   
All subsequent stages were also performed in isolation until the results were 
available for comparison.  We assigned each probable cause and contributory factor 
to a number of common categories.   We did not use a pre-defined taxonomy.   Each 
analyst created their own classification as they progressed through the incidents.   
As before, everyone involved in the project could assign any labels that they chose. 
The classification process raised several practical problems.  For example, the 
following section is taken from an NTSB maritime report: 
 
Contributing to the amount of property damage and the number and types of 
injuries sustained during the accident was the failure of the U.S. Coast Guard, 
the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, and International 
RiverCenter to adequately assess, manage, or mitigate the risks associated with 
locating unprotected commercial enterprises in areas vulnerable to vessel 
strikes (NTSB MAR-98/01) 
 
This passage could yield three contributory factors; one associated with the U.S. 
Coast Guard, another with the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans 
and one with the International RiverCenter.   Another analyst might identify three 
factors associated with a failure to adequately assess, manage, or mitigate the risks 
of vessel strikes.   Conversely, this passage could yield the cross product of nine 
contributory factors where each agency failed in each of these three ways.   We 
imposed no constraints on this issue except to agree that compound statements 
could be interpreted to yield several individual causes or contributory factors.    It 
was left up to the reasoned judgement of each analyst on a case-by-case basis.  The 
results of this process were then collated.   There were some obvious differences in 
the terms used but there were also strong similarities.  For instance, one analyst 
identified ‘weather’ as a contributory factor while another identified the 
‘environment’ and so on.  Where such disagreements occurred we used a process of 
discussion to agree on a common term to support comparisons between the 
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classifications.   Distinctions were preserved between different terms where no 
agreement could be reached between the analysts. 
 
 
 
 
 Analyst C  Analyst M 
P – Probable Cause, 
C - Contributory 
P C  P C 
Design 4 7  4 10 
Human Error 11 7  9 7 
Maintenance 2 2  2 0 
Company/Organisation 12 6  15 6 
Regulatory 7 9  4 15 
Weather 1 0  2 0 
Equipment 0 1  0 2 
Physical Structure 0 0  2 0 
Industry 0 0  0 1 
Unknown 2 0  0 0 
Total 39 32  38 41 
 
Table 1: Analysis of Causes and Contributory Factors in NTSB Maritime Accidents (1996-
2006) 
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Figure 1: Pie-Charts of Causes and Contributory Factors in NTSB Maritime Accidents  
(1996-2006) 
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3 US National Transportation Safety Board Results 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the results of this classification process for both the 
probable causes and the contributory factors in the NTSB reports.  The 22 incidents 
yielded a total of 39 and 38 probable causes for the two analysts.  There were 32 
and 41 contributory causes.  Across all incidents, there was a mean of 1.75 causes 
per incident with a mean of 1.65 contributory factors per incident.   The 
classification in Table 1 represents the product of an initial amalgamation, using the 
method described in the previous section.   In contrast, Figure 1 uses an additional 
phase of generalisation that eases comparisons between the aviation data introduced 
in previous paragraphs and the results of the maritime analysis.   This generalisation 
groups equipment failures and design issues.   It also combines regulatory issues, 
maintenance problems, company specific factors and organisational issues.   As can 
be seen, there are strong similarities both between the different analysts and 
between the NTSB maritime and aviation data sets.   For example, the combined 
causal and contributory factors in the NTSB aviation study yielded 48% related to 
organisational factors, 37% to individual issues, 12% related to equipment and 3% 
to other factors (Johnson and Holloway, 2004).   
The slight disagreement over the total number of contributory causes between the 
investigators might appear to be confusing given that the NTSB explicitly labels 
probable and contributory causes.   As mentioned, however, some probable causes 
described several different problems.   For example, the report into a collision 
between a US Coast Guard vessel and a small passenger boat contains the following 
argument;   
 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause 
of the collision between the Coast Guard patrol boat CG242513 and the 
small passenger vessel Bayside Blaster was the failure of the coxswain of the 
Coast Guard patrol boat to operate his vessel at a safe speed in a restricted-
speed area frequented by small passenger vessels and in conditions of limited 
visibility due to darkness and background lighting. Contributing to the cause 
of the accident was the lack of adequate Coast Guard oversight of non-
standard boat operations.   (US NTSB MAR-02/05) 
 
Analyst C classified the causes as human error and weather.  Analyst M identified 
human error and the environment.   The contributory causes were listed as 
‘organizational’ by analyst C and regulatory by analyst M.  As can be seen, this 
form of analysis depends upon a degree of subjective interpretation within the 
statements of probable cause and contributory factors.  Hence Figure 1 indicates a 
surprising level of agreement between the analysts.  Many NTSB reports yielded 
only a single probable cause.  For instance, NTSB report MAR-02/03 contained the 
following summary: 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause 
of the grounding of the Finest was the failure of the vessel master to use 
appropriate navigational procedures and equipment to determine the vessel’s 
position while approaching the Shrewsbury River channel. Contributing to the 
cause of the grounding was the lack of readily visible fixed navigational aids. 
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Also contributing to the cause of the grounding was the failure of New York 
Fast Ferry to require the use of installed navigation equipment and to set 
guidelines for operations in adverse environmental conditions.  (US NTSB 
MAR-02/03) 
 
Both analysts identified the single probable cause as an instance of human error.   In 
contrast to this simple case, our analysis identified a small number of incidents that 
proved to be extremely complex at least in terms of the number of causes and 
contributory factors.   For instance, the NTSB report into the ramming of the Eads 
Bridge by barges in the Admiral St. Louis Harbor in Missouri provided the 
following summary of probable and contributory causes: 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause 
of the ramming of the Eads Bridge in St. Louis Harbor by barges in tow of 
the Anne Holly and the subsequent breakup of the tow was the poor 
decision-making of the captain of the Anne Holly in attempting to transit St. 
Louis Harbor with a large tow, in darkness, under high current and flood 
conditions, and the failure of the management of American Milling, L.P., to 
provide adequate policy and direction to ensure the safe operation of its 
towboats.  The National Transportation Safety Board also determines that the 
probable cause of the near breakaway of the President Casino on the Admiral 
was the failure of the owner, the local and State authorities, and the U.S. 
Coast Guard to adequately protect the permanently moored vessel from 
waterborne and current-related risks (NTSB MAR-00/01) 
 
Analyst C identified six probable causes; three regulatory failures, two 
organisational failures and one instance of human error.  Analyst M classified seven 
causes; one environmental problem; one organisational issue; three regulatory 
problems; one company issue and an instance of human error.   Neither analyst 
identified any contributory factors.  Such findings illustrate considerable differences 
in interpretation and classification.   Given the limited sample size and the small 
number of analysts it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the analysis of 
particular incidents.   However, the growing body of evidence from this and 
previous studies does illustrate that such incidents are the exception rather than the 
norm.   This methodology can yield a surprising level of agreement in the 
identification of causal and contributory factors in official investigation reports. 
Both analysts identified a large number of systemic causes and contributory 
factors throughout the sample of NTSB reports.   Overall managerial or 
organisational failures accounted for approximately 53% of all probable causes and 
contributory factors.   Individual forms of ‘human error’ only represented 27% of 
the total.   Equipment failures came to 17% and 3% fell into the ‘other’ 
classification.   Even after the results from our previous aviation study, these 
findings came as a considerable surprise.   In particular, we had anticipated a higher 
proportion of equipment related problems in the maritime industry.   However, the 
NTSB reports seem to reveal the commitment that investigators within this agency 
have to look beyond immediate causes and investigate the organisational and 
regulatory issues contributing to incidents and accidents.  
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As mentioned, the 22 NTSB reports in our sample yielded approximately 70 causes 
and contributory factors for each analyst. This provided useful insights about 
individual and organisational factors when aggregated across the decade.  However, 
the sample arguably yielded insufficient evidence to support clear conclusions about 
trends between 1996 and 2006.  This point can be illustrated by the Bar Chart in 
Figure 2.  The diagram provides a year-by-year distribution of causes and 
contributory factors for our sample of accident reports.   The dates refer to the year 
in which the documents were published rather than to the accidents themselves, this 
follows the convention used in Appendix A and enables cross referencing with the 
NTSB library.   The number of causal and contributory factors in each category is 
strongly influenced by individual accidents.   Longer term trends are obscured by 
the characteristics of particular incidents.  For example, a single accident in 2000 
accounted for all of the regulatory and organisational causes in that year.   Similarly, 
the same accident was caused by both instances of human error recorded in 2001. 
 
The Bar Chart in Figure 2 also illustrates the difficulty of visualising the results of 
an analysis into the causal and contributory factors in major accident reports.   
Simple graphs cannot easily convey the changing proportions of causes in different 
categories when the number of factors is partly determined by the number of 
accident reports that are issued in each year.  In our sample of NTSB reports, the 
frequency of particular causal factors is strongly determined by the number of 
reports which varies from none in 2003 to 5 in 2002.   Figure 3, therefore, uses a J-
H area graph to map the changing percentage of causes and contributory factors for 
each year from 1996 to 2006.   This helps to ease the visualisation problems by 
normalising across accident frequencies, although the count is still shown on the X-
Axis.   As can be seen, the lack of any coherent pattern confirms our previous 
argument based on the Bar-Chart in Figure 2, that the individual causes and 
contributory factors of a small number of accidents obscures any longer term trends 
over the sample.    Although this visualisation provides a normalised view of causes 
over time, it does not resolve the problems associated with a limited sample size.  
The following section, therefore, provides a more sustained analysis of 160 
Canadian TSB maritime reports compared with only 22 in the NTSB sample.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of Causes and Contributory Factors in NTSB Maritime 
Reports  
by Year (Analyst C) 
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Figure 3: J-H Graph of Causes & Contributory Factors in NTSB Maritime Reports  
by Year (Analyst C) 
 
4 Canadian Transportation Safety Board Results 
We were anxious to determine whether the US NTSB was atypical in the 
prominence of regulatory and organizational factors in their major maritime and 
aviation accident reports.   The results of our previous study had already identified 
some differences in the aviation data between Canada and the USA.   As mentioned, 
these differences stem from the traffic patterns in each country.  They may also be 
due to differences in the training of investigators and the reporting procedures used 
in each country (Johnson, 2003).   We were, therefore, anxious to determine 
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whether these patterns could also be seen in maritime accident reports. Our work 
proceeded in a similar manner to that of the NTSB sample.   The first stage was to 
make our initial selection of incidents from the many thousands of adverse events 
that are reported to the TSB each year.  We focused on the longer more sustained 
accident reports; that is, those containing numbered chapter headings.  These did, 
however, include near miss incidents as well as events leading to multiple fatalities.   
We identified a far larger sample compared to either our aviation datasets or to the 
NTSB major maritime incident reports.  In the previous studies, we had used a 
heuristic to cut down the TSB aviation corpus so that we only focussed on the most 
serious incidents and accidents.   This left a total sample of 27 TSB aviation 
documents compared to 26 reports from the NTSB.  In contrast, our more ambitious 
maritime study yielded 22 accident reports from the NTSB and 160 marine reports 
from the TSB.   The problems of obtaining comparable samples might seem like a 
relatively trivial methodological issue.   However, the different ways in which the 
NTSB and TSB group their major accident reports has important consequences for 
anyone attempting to identify patterns in the causes of adverse events across 
different countries.   It can be hard to make comparisons between incidents in 
different countries and this can impair the exchange of lessons learned from 
previous failures. 
The TSB documents included sections on "Findings as to Causes and 
Contributing Factors", "Findings as to Risk", and "Other Findings”.   We focussed 
on the sections detailing causes and contributory factors.  This task was complicated 
because some reports used a slightly different format with two sections entitled 
"Causes" and "Findings”.   As might be expected, we focused on the section 
describing the causes of the adverse event. As before, we independently categorised 
the probable causes and contributory factors.   There was no expectation that each 
analyst would use the same categories that had emerged from the analysis of the 
NTSB maritime reports.   This posed several problems that had not arisen during the 
previous studies.   For example, many hours of analysis were required to work 
through all of the 160 reports.   It was difficult for analysts to ensure that they 
applied the same classification criteria at the end of the period as they had used at 
the start of their analysis.   As we shall see, the very diversity of the incidents 
included in this larger sample also forced the analysts to develop a far wider range 
of categories for the TSB sample.  Further problems stemmed from the way in 
which the TSB group together probable causes and contributory factors within their 
reports.    For instance, the section of a report into the ‘Capsizing and Loss of Life 
on a Small Fishing Vessel Cap Rouge II off the Entrance to Fraser River, British 
Columbia’ contains the following list: 
 
3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors 
1. Inherent transverse stability was progressively reduced by structural additions 
and the installation of more and heavier fishing gear, including the adoption of 
a "West Coast" seine net of 7.4 tonnes, all of which were located at or above 
the main deck level. 
2. The installation of additional gear and its effects on stability were not 
monitored or assessed by a suitably qualified person, nor brought to the 
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attention of Transport Canada (TC) inspectors, between or during routine 
quadrennial inspections. 
3. The watertight integrity of the main deck was compromised by the ineffective 
gaskets of five flush-fitting manhole covers, which resulted in extensive 
downflooding, a marked increase in after trim, and reduced transverse stability. 
4. Because of their limited knowledge of basic principles of trim and stability, the 
additional weight of the seine net, the inherent heel to starboard, the routine 
presence of water on deck, and the towing resistance of the seine skiff were not 
considered by those on board the Cap Rouge II to present any undue risk to 
vessel operation. 
5. The vessel lost transverse stability due principally to the cumulative free 
surface effects of water shipped and retained on the main deck and other liquids 
in four partially full fish holds, four fuel tanks, a freshwater tank, and the 
lazarette. 
6. The rapidity of the capsizing precluded orderly abandonment of the vessel.    
(TSB report M02W0147) 
 
As can be seen, the TSB provide no explicit indication between causes and 
contributory factors in this list.   Each analyst, therefore, had to arrive at this 
classification independently.   In consequence, analyst C identified two causal 
factors of design and regulation.   Analyst M identified design and equipment 
failure.   Analyst C found four contributory factors.   These included maintenance, 
human error, design and ‘other’.   Analyst M identified human error; environmental 
factors and regulatory issues.    
 
 Analyst C  Analyst M 
 Probable 
cause 
Contributory 
Factor 
 Probable 
cause 
Contributory 
Factor 
Clothing 0 0  1 2 
Company/Organisation 16 54  15 60 
Design 33 50  23 45 
Emergency responders 0 0  0 3 
Environment/Weather 30 20  35 27 
Equipment failure 31 12  32 8 
Health 0 0  0 1 
Human Error 106 146  120 142 
Maintenance 15 21  10 18 
Operations 33 23  8 8 
Physics 0 0  15 11 
Regulator 3 9  2 12 
Unknown 5 2  4 2 
Others 0 4  0 0 
Total 272 341  265 339 
 
Table 2: Causal Information in the TSB Maritime Dataset 
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The decision to allow each analyst to identify multiple causes and contributory 
factors within the lists presented by the TSB led to some differences in the analysis 
provided by each investigator.  The 160 maritime reports yielded a total of 272 
probable causes for analyst C and 265 for analyst M.   Analyst C also identified 341 
contributory factors while analyst M found 339.  Table 2 provides a more detailed 
distribution of these causes and contributory factors within the various categories 
that were induced during our analysis.   The variance between the investigators 
could have been reduced if a more formal method for distinguishing causes from 
contributory factors had been used.   For instance, the PRISMA analysis technique 
provides a flow chart that investigators can work through to identify the role that 
various factors can play in an incident or accident (Johnson, 2003). At the start of 
the study, we decided not to use this approach because the development of 
appropriate root cause analysis techniques remains an active area for research.   We 
are currently exploring the impact that more formal techniques might have on the 
results of our analysis.  
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Figure 4: Categorisation of Causes and Contributory Factors in the TSB  
Maritime Dataset 
 
Figure 4 presents an overview of the more detailed classification illustrated in Table 
2.   By combining causes and contributory factors we can abstract away from some 
of the individual classification differences that were mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs.   Company/organisational issues were grouped with regulatory factors, 
maintenance and operations.   Equipment related causes and contributory factors 
were combined with design issues.   ‘Others’ included environmental conditions, 
meteorological factors, unknown and other issues.   As can be seen, the TSB 
maritime reports show a pattern that is very similar to the results from our previous 
studies of the TSB reports for major aviation accidents.  Our earlier work on NTSB 
aviation reports showed that approximately 50% of all causes and contributory 
factors could be related to individual ‘error’ within our sample of aviation reports.   
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20% stemmed from equipment related issues, 22% to organisations and 8% to other 
factors.   Here we can see a remarkably similar pattern in the maritime incidents, 
especially between analysts C and M.   The initial analysis indicates that individual 
error plays a more prominent role in the TSB dataset than in the NTSB and that this 
pattern reflects the results from our previous aviation study.   This can also be 
explained in similar terms.  For example, the Canadian reports contain many 
incidents involving small charter vessels and owner-operators.   In such cases, there 
is less opportunity for larger management structures and external organisations to 
create the preconditions for failure.   Many of these incidents occur in remote 
locations well away from busy, regulated passages.   Finally, it might also be argued 
that the prominence of individual error is an artefact of the different analytical 
techniques being employed by each agency (Johnson, 2003) 
   It is important not to exaggerate the prominence of human error in our study.   The 
50% of causal and contributory factors identified for individual failure in Figure 4 is 
relatively low compared to most estimates made in the wider human factors 
literature.   It should also be remembered that this range is still much higher than 
our results for the NTSB dataset.  Within the Canadian incidents, Figure 5 illustrates 
the consistency of the analysis by aggregating across both analysts but 
distinguishing between the proportion of causes and contributory factors in each of 
the four high level categories.  This is an important analysis because it shows that 
there is no particular focus on individual error as a primary cause rather than a 
contributory factor nor can it be argued that the TSB investigators focus on 
organisational issues as contextual issues rather than more ‘direct’ causes. 
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Figure 5: Categorisation of Causes and Contributory Factors in the TSB  
Maritime Dataset 
 
Figures 6 and 7 use ‘J-H Graphs’ to map the distribution of causes and 
contributory factors across the study period 1996-2004.  This end-point reflects the 
latest collection of reports released by Transport Canada at the time of writing (late 
2006).   The y-axis shows the percentage of reports in each category, which is 
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mapped as a percentage of the total causes for that year in Figure 6 and as a 
percentage of total contributory factors in Figure 7.  As can be seen from the x-axis, 
this helps to normalise for a strong decline in the number of maritime reports issued; 
from 49 in 1996 to only 4 in 2004.   A number of arguments can be used to explain 
this decline.   The fall may reflect a genuine improvement in maritime safety over 
the period studies.  This, in turn, may reflect changes in market structure as high-
risk, single operator work has arguably decreased. Alternatively, the decline in 
major accident reports may reflect institutional changes in the investigation and 
reporting of major accidents by Transport Canada. 
The increasing focus on organisational factors is readily apparent in Figures 6 and 
7, from relatively small beginnings at the start of the sample to an increasing 
proportion of the causes and contributory factors in more recent reports.  The focus 
on human error seems to have fluctuated from year to year.  As with the NTSB 
results this may simply reflect the influence of particular adverse events on the 
totals for a particular year.  However, there does appear to be a declining focus on 
individual error as a contributory factor over the study period even though Figure 3 
shows that the proportion of contributory factors related to human error is 
comparable to the proportion of causes in this classification.  Further work is 
required to determine whether this is part of a sustained trend within the TSB 
reporting of maritime accidents.   In particular, it is important also to identify causal 
explanations for any patterns that are sustained.   For example, Ayeko (2002) has 
described the influence that Reason’s (1997) work on organisational causes of 
accidents has had upon investigators’ training with the TSB.   It could be argued 
that systematic changes in the causal analysis of major accidents should be apparent 
in the J-H graphs as increasing numbers of inspectors are exposed to these 
initiatives. 
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Figure 6: J-H Graph of Causes in TSB Maritime Reports by Year (Analyst C) 
 
5 Conclusions 
We have described the results of an independent analysis of the primary and 
contributory causes of maritime accidents in both the United States and Canada 
between 1996 and 2006.   The purpose of the study was to assess the comparative 
frequency of a range of causal factors in the reporting of adverse events.  Our results 
suggest that many of these high consequence accidents were attributed to human 
error.  However, the overall proportion was very much smaller than has been 
suggested elsewhere in the human factors literature.   A large number of reports also 
mentioned wider systemic issues, including the managerial and regulatory context 
of maritime operations.   Based on these results we believe that is inaccurate to 
assert, as some have, that most investigations stop as soon as they find someone to 
blame, or that organizational causes are usually ignored.  There are wider 
implications.  For example, some have used the supposed predominance of human 
error as a primary cause in accidents to justify automation as a means reducing 
operator intervention.   By restricting the scope for human ‘error’, it should be 
possible to reduce the overall accident rate (Johnson, 2003).  This paper undermines 
these arguments by challenging the claimed prominence of human error in incidents 
and accidents. 
In order to communicate our findings, we have introduced J-H graphs to visualise 
the proportion of causes and contributory factors associated with human error, 
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equipment failure and other high level classifications in longitudinal studies of 
accident reports.   These diagrams provide means of normalising across the causes 
and contributory factors that lead to rare and atypical events.   The J-H charts show 
that our limited sample of NTSB reports could not be used to identify emerging 
patterns in the proportion of accidents associated with human error, equipment 
failure or organisational issues for twelve month intervals from 1996 to 2006.   
However, it is possible to discern a rise in the proportion of organisational issues 
that are identified as contributory factors in a broader sample of TSB maritime 
accident reports from 1996 to 2004, which includes the most recent publications. 
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Figure 7: J-H Graph of Contributory Factors in TSB Maritime Reports (Analyst C) 
 
A key finding from our research is that investigatory organizations show a similar 
distribution of causes and contributory factors between individual, organizational 
and equipment failures across different modes of transportation.  Hence, there are 
strong similarities between the prominence of organizational factors in the NTSB 
reports in aviation and the maritime industries.   Similarly, close comparisons can 
be made between the classifications for the TSB aviation and maritime reports.   
There are, however, considerable differences between the NTSB and TSB 
distributions in both modes.  We conclude that these results are due to differences in 
the operational profile in each country.   For instance, the TSB reports document a 
larger number of incidents involving private pilots and owner-operator vessels in 
remote areas than their NTSB counterparts.   These differences may also be due to 
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different analytical techniques, such as the TSB Integrated Safety Investigation 
Methodology approach (Ayeko 2002, Johnson 2003).  Further work is required to 
more accurately trace the impact that investigator training has on the conclusions of 
accident and incident reports.   Such studies must also consider the knock-on effects 
that these findings will have on the engineering of safety-critical systems across 
many different industries.  
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Appendix A: Data Sources Used in the Study 
An important aim of our study was to enable others to replicate our work.   The 
NTSB and TSB documents in our data set included all major maritime reports 
between 1996-2006.    
 
For the NTSB they were:  
 
MAR-96/01, MAR-97/01, MAR-97/02, MAR-98/01, MAR-98/02, MAR-
98/03, MAR-99/01, MAR-00/01, MAR-01/01, MAR-01/02, MAR-02/01, 
MAR-02/02, MAR-02/03, MAR-02/04, MAR-02/05, MAR-04/01, MAR-
05/01, MAR-05/02, MAR-06/01, MAR-06/02, MAR-06/03. 
 
We also included the NTSB report into the allision between the tow boat Robert Y. 
Love with Interstate 40 on 26th May 2002.   This document appears in both the 
marine and highways archive, following the NTSB’s approach we use the highway 
identifier (HAR-04/05).    
 
The TSB reports in our data set were:  
 
M96C0022, M96C0032, M96C0032, M96C0056, M96C0062, M96C008, 
M96C0090, M96C0093, M96F001, M96F0023, M96F0025, M96H0016, 
M96L0006, M96L0017, M96L0037, M96L0043, M96L0052, M96L0059, 
M96L0069, M96L0083, M96L0111, M96L0112, M96L0116, M96L0131, 
M96L0142, M96L0146, M96L0148, M96L0156, M96M0002, M96M0038, 
M96M0090, M96M0128, M96M0132, M96M0144, M96M0150, M96M0176, 
M96M0178, M96N0047, M96N0061, M96N0063, M96W0025, M96W0061, 
M96W0100, M96W0109, M96W0175, M96W0183, M96W0187, M96W0243, 
M96W0250, M97C0013, M97C0055, M97C0057, M97F0002, M97F0027, 
M97L0019, M97L0021, M97L0030, M97L0035, M97L0050, M97L0076, 
M97M0005, M97M003, M97M0094, M97M0141, M97N0067, M97N0071, 
M97N0073, M97N0099, M97N0129, M97W0022, M97W0044, M97W0048, 
M97W0152, M97W0194, M97W0197, M97W0236, M98C0004, M98C0015, 
M98C0026, M98C0040, M98C0046, M98C0066, M98F0009, M98F0023, 
M98F0039, M98L0097, M98L0120, M98L0139, M98L0149, M98L0165, 
M98M0003, M98M0061, M98M0078, M98N0001, M98N0064, M98W0019, 
M98W0045, M98W0245, M99C0003, M99C0005, M99C0008, M99C0016, 
M99C0019, M99C0027, M99C0048, M99F0023, M99F0038, M99F0042, 
M99L0011, M99L0098, M99L0099, M99L0126, M99M0062, M99M0142, 
M99M0161, M99W0033, M99W0058, M99W0078, M99W0087, M99W0095, 
M99W0116, M99W0133, M99W0137, M99W0145, M00C0026, M00C0033, 
M00C0053, M00C0069, M00H0008, M00L0034, M00L0114, M00N0098, 
M00W0005, M00W0044, M00W0059, M00W0230, M00W0265, M00W0303, 
M01C0033, M01C0054, M01L0080, M01L0112, M01M0100, M01N0020, 
M01W0006, M02C0030, M02W0147, M02C0064, M03L0026, M03C0016, 
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M03W0073, M03N0050, M03M0077, M03L0124, M04L0050, M04L0066, 
M04L0099, M04L0105. 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Additional Graphs 
 
Figure B-1 illustrates the year by year breakdown on causes and contributory factors 
for analyst C across the NTSB sample using the high-level classifications that were 
introduced in previous sections.  As can be seen, this confirms the lack of any 
apparent pattern in the small number of reports (22) even though they yield more 
than 70 causal/contributory factors. 
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Figure B-1: J-H Graph of Causes & Contributory Factors in NTSB Maritime 
Reports by Year (Analyst C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
